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Abstract. A real-time system for power-down control in audio/video compo-
nents is modeled and verified using the real-time model checker UPPAAL. The
system is supposed to reside in an audio/video component and control (read from
and write to) links to neighbor audio/video components such as TV, VCR and
remote–control. In particular, the system is responsible for the powering up and
down of the component in between the arrival of data, and in order to do so in a
safe way without loss of data, it is essential that no link interrupts are lost. Hence,
a component system is a multitasking system with hard real-time requirements,
and we present techniques for modeling time consumption in such a multitasked,
prioritized system. The work has been carried out in a collaboration between Aal-
borg University and the audio/video company B&O. By modeling the system, 3
design errors were identified and corrected, and the following verification con-
firmed the validity of the design but also revealed the necessity for an upper limit
of the interrupt frequency. The resulting design has been implemented and it is
going to be incorporated as part of a new product line.
1 Introduction
Since the basic results by Alur, Courcoubetis and Dill [3, 4] on decidability of model
checking for real–time systems with dense time, a number of tools for automatic ver-
ification of hybrid and real–time systems have emerged [7, 14, 10]. These tools have
by now reached a state, where they are mature enough for application on industrial
development of real-time systems as we hope to demonstrate in this paper.
One such tool is the real–time verification tool UPPAAL1 [7] developed jointly by
BRICS2 at Aalborg University and Department of Computing Systems at Uppsala Uni-
versity. The tool provides support for automatic verification of safety and bounded live-
ness properties of real–time systems and contains a number of additional features in-
cluding graphical interfaces for designing and simulating system models. The tool has
been applied successfully to a number of case–studies [13, 18, 5, 6, 16, 9] which can
roughly be divided in two classes: real–time controllers and real–time communication
protocols.
1 See URL: http://www.docs.uu.se/docs/rtmv/uppaal for information about UPPAAL.
2 BRICS – Basic Research in Computer Science – is a basic research centre funded by the Danish
government at Aarhus and Aalborg University.
Industrial developers of embedded systems have been following the above work
with great interest, because the real–time aspects of concurrent systems can be ex-
tremely difficult to analyze during the design and implementation phase. One such
company is Bang& Olufsen (B&O) – having development and production of fully
integrated home audio/video systems as a main activity.
The work presented in this paper documents a collaboration between AAU (Aal-
borg University) – under the BRICS project – and B&O on the development of one
of the company’s new designs: a system for audio/video power control. The system is
supposed to reside in an audio/video component and control (read from and write to)
links to neighbor audio/video components such as TV, VCR and remote–control. In
particular, the system is responsible for the powering up and down of the component in
between the arrival of data, and in order to do so, it is essential that no link interrupts
are lost. The work is a continuation of an earlier successful collaboration [13] between
the same two organizations, where an existing audio/video protocol for detecting colli-
sions on a link between audio/video components was analyzed and found to contain a
timing error causing occasional data loss. The interesting point was, that the error was
a decade old, like the protocol, and that it was known to exist – but normal testing had
never been sufficient in tracking down the reason for the error.
The collaboration between B&O and AAU spanned 3 weeks (4 including report
writing), and was very intense the first week, where a representative from B&O vis-
ited AAU, and a first sketch of the model was produced. During the next two weeks,
the model was refined, and 15 properties formulated by B&O in natural language were
formalized and then verified using the UPPAAL model checker. During a meeting, revi-
sions to the model and properties were suggested, and a final effort was spent on model
revision, re-verification and report writing. The present paper is an intensive elaboration
of the preliminary report [12]3.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains an informal description of the
B&O protocol, and in section 3 we present the UPPAAL modeling language and tool.
In section 4 we present our techniques for modeling timed transitions and interrupts in
the UPPAAL language. Section 5 presents the formal modeling of this protocol in the
UPPAAL language, while section 6 presents the verification results. Finally section 7
provides an evaluation of the project and points out future work.
2 Informal Description of the Power Down Protocol
In this section, we provide an informal description of the designed protocol for power
down control in an audio/video component. As advocated in [15], we divide the de-
scription into environment, syntax, and protocol rules.
2.1 Protocol Environment
A typical B&O configuration (see figure 1) consists of a number of components, which
are interconnected by different kinds of links carrying audio/video data and (or) control
3 A full version of the paper is available at
http://ic-www.arc.nasa.gov/ic/projects/amphion/people/havelund.
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information. Each component is equipped with two processors controlling audio/video
devices and links, and among other tasks, the processors must minimize the energy
consumption when the component goes stand by. Each processor may be in one of two
modes: (1) active, where it is operational and can handle its devices and links, (2) stand
by, where it is unable to do anything except wake up and enter active mode. One of the
processors acts as a master in the sense that it may order the other processor (the slave)
to enter stand by mode (and thereby reduce energy consumption). Due to physical laws4
a processor cannot leave stand by mode via one atomic action, and the purpose of the
protocol is to ensure that stand by operation is handled in a consistent way, i.e. when
one of the processors enters or leaves stand by mode, this is also recognized by the other
processor. Furthermore, whenever a processor senses valid data on an external link, it
must leave stand by operation. Also, the real-time duration for switching between the






Fig. 1.Example B&O configuration.
Figure 2 illustrates the processor interconnection and our model of the software ar-
chitecture for one of the processors. Each processor communicates with devices and
other components via external links5, and the two processors are interconnected via an
internal link. The software architecture will be almost identical for the two processors,
and in this report we concentrate on the IOP3212 processor – the slave processor. The
main software module is the IOP process which communicates with the AP processor,
the external link drivers, and the interrupt handlers according to the protocol rules de-
scribed below. The protocol forms the crucial part of the software design, because it
must assure that no data and interrupts are lost (in order to leave stand by operation at
due time).
4 It takes e.g. approx. 1 ms to make the processor operational when it has been in stand by
operation.
















Fig. 2. Software architecture of the power down protocol. The protocol entity process (IOP) re-
ceives protocol commands (left arrows) from the drivers and interrupt handlers by issuing check
commands (right arrows).
2.2 Protocol Syntax
The power down protocol entity (the IOP process) communicates with its environ-
ment (AP processor, link drivers and interrupt handlers) via the protocol commands
in the set:{ap down, apactive, apdown ack, apdown nack, data, nodata, interrupt,
no interrupt}. The ap downcommand is sent from the AP processor and commands
the IOP processor to enter stand by operation. Thedatacommand is sent from a link
driver and indicates that meaningful input has been detected on the link, whereas the
no data command indicates that there is no input from the link. Likewise, theint r-
rupt (no interrupt) command is sent from from the link interrupt handler and indi-
cates that an interrupt (or no interrupt) has been received at the link interrupt interface.
The commandsap active, ap downack, ap downnackinforms the AP3002 processor
about state changes of the protocol, that is,ap activeis sent when the IOP3212 proces-
sor becomes active,ap downack is sent when it accepts to enter stand by mode, and
ap downnackis sent when stand by cannot be entered.
2.3 Protocol Rules
In order to give an intuitive explanation of the protocol, we describe below in an infor-
mal way the major protocol rules, which must be obeyed by the IOP protocol entity. We
leave out the details on communication with interrupt handlers and drivers, which will
be described in the formalization section. In order to structure the description, we define
the following major phases (see Figure 3 below) for the entity: theactive phase, where
the IOP is in normal (active) operation, thecheck driver phase, where the IOP process
is waiting for a driver status (no data/data) in order to decide whether or not to leave
the active phase, thestandby phase, where the IOP processor is out of operation, and
thecheck interrupts phase, where the IOP processor is waiting for an interrupt handler
4
status (no interrupt/interrupt) in order to decide whether or not to enter the stand by


















Fig. 3. Major protocol phases. The dotted lines indicate transitions leading towards power down.
The full lines are leading towards power up. The two neighboring ’check driver’ phases are
necessary in order to be able to ignore noise from the communication lines.
Active rule In the active phase, the IOP protocol entity must enter the check driver
phase, whenever aap downcommand is received from the AP processor.
Check driver ruleIn the check driver phase, the IOP protocol entity commands the
drivers to check whether or not meaningful data are received from the links. The
outcome of the check defines the succeeding phase according to Figure 3.
Standby rule Whenever an interrupt is received in the stand by phase, the IOP protocol
entity must enter the check driver phase.
Check interrupts ruleIn the check interrupts phase, the protocol entity commands the
interrupt handlers to check for pending interrupts. If no interrupts are pending, the
stand by phase can safely be entered. Otherwise, the check driver phase is entered.
The above rules have to be implemented in such a way, that (1) Whenever an in-
terrupt is received and meaningful data is present on the given link, the active phase
must be entered, and (2) Whenever a down signal is received from the AP processor
and no interrupts and valid data are present, the stand by phase must be entered. The
delay caused by software of these transitions may not exceed1500µs since otherwise
data may be lost.
The informal rules form the basis for the model design, and in the analysis section,
we present a complete list of protocol requirements in terms of properties of the formal
protocol model.
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3 The UPPAAL Model and Tool
UPPAAL is a tool box for symbolic simulation and automatic verification of real–timed
systems modeled as networks of timed automata [4] extended with global shared in-
teger variables. More precisely, a model consists of a collection of non–deterministic
processes with finite control structure and real–valued clocks communicating through
channels and shared integer variables. The tool box is developed in collaboration be-
tween BRICS at Aalborg University and Department of Computing Systems at Uppsala
University, and has been applied to several case–studies [13, 18, 5, 6, 16, 9].
The current version of UPPAAL is implemented in C++, XFORMS and MOTIF and
includes the following main features:
– A graphical interface based on Autograph [8] allowing graphical descriptions of
systems.
– A compiler transforming graphical descriptions into a textual programming format.
– A simulator, which provides a graphical visualization and recording of the possi-
ble dynamic behaviors of a system description. This allows for inexpensive fault
detection in the early modeling stages.
– A model checker for automatic verification of safety and bounded–liveness proper-
ties by on–the–fly reachability analysis.
– Generation of (shortest) diagnostic traces in case verification of a particular real–
time system fails. The diagnostic traces may be graphically visualized using the
simulator.
A system description (or model) in UPPAAL consists of a collection of automata
modeling the finite control structures of the system. In addition the model uses a finite
set of (global) real–valued clocks and integer variables.
Consider the model of Figure 4. The model consists of two components A and B
with control nodes{A0, A1, A2, A3} and{B0, B1, B2, B3} respectively. In addition
to these discrete control structures, the model uses two clocksx andy , one integer
variablen and a channela for communication.
y >= 3
a!





n := n + 1
A0
(y <= 6)(   )(   )(   )
A1 A2 A3
B0
(x <= 4)(   )(   )(   )
c:B1:c :c:c B2 B3
A
B
Fig. 4. An example UPPAAL model
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The edges of the automata are decorated with three types of labels: aguard, ex-
pressing a condition on the values of clocks and integer variables that must be satisfied
in order for the edge to be taken; a synchronizationactionwhich is performed when
the edge is taken forcing as in CCS [19] synchronization with another component on
a complementary action6, and finally a number ofclock resetsandassignmentsto in-
teger variables. All three types of labels are optional: absence of a guard is interpreted
as the conditiontrue, and absence of a synchronization action indicates an internal
(non–synchronizing) edge similar toτ–transitions in CCS. Reconsider Figure 4. Here
the edge betweenA0 andA1 can only be taken, when the value of the clocky is greater
than or equal to3. When the edge is taken the actiona! is performed thus insisting on
synchronization with B on the complementary actiona? ; that is for A to take the edge
in question, B must simultaneously be able to take the edge fromB0 to B1. Finally,
when taking the edge, the clocky is reset to0.
In addition, control nodes may be decorated with so–calledinvariants, which ex-
press constraints on the clock values in order for control to remain in a particular node.
Thus, in Figure 4, control can only remain inA0 as long as the value ofy is no more
than6.
Formally, states of a UPPAAL model are of the form(l, v), wherel is a control
vectorindicating the current control node for each component of the network andv is an
assignmentgiven the current value for each clock and integer variable. Theinitial state
of a UPPAAL model consists of the initial node of all components7 and an assignment
giving the value0 for all clocks and integer variables. A UPPAAL model determines the
following two types oftransitionsbetween states:
Delay transitionsAs long as none of the invariants of the control nodes in the current
state are violated, time may progress without affecting the control node vector and
with all clock values incremented with the elapsed duration of time. In Figure 4,
from the initial state〈(A0, B0), x = 0, y = 0, n = 0〉 time may elapse3.5 time
units leading to the state〈(A0, B0), x = 3.5, y = 3.5, n = 0〉. However, time
cannot elapse5 time units as this would violate the invariant ofB0.
Action transitionsIf two complementary labeled edges of two different components
are enabled in a state then they can synchronize. Thus in state〈(A0, B0), x =
3.5, y = 3.5, n = 0〉 the two components can synchronize ona leading to the
new state〈(A1, B1), x = 0, y = 0, n = 5〉 (note thatx , y , andn have been ap-
propriately updated). If a component has an internal edge enabled, the edge can be
taken without any synchronization. Thus in state〈(A1, B1), x = 0, y = 0, n = 5〉,
the B–component can perform without synchronizing with A, leading to the state
〈(A1, B2), x = 0, y = 0, n = 6〉.
Finally, in order to enable modeling of atomicity of transition–sequences of a par-
ticular component (i.e. without time–delay and interleaving of other components) nodes
may be marked ascommitted(indicated by ac–prefix). If in a state one of the compo-
nents is in a control node labeled as being committed, no delay is allowed to occur and
6 Given a channel namea, a! anda? denote complementary actions corresponding tosending
respectivelyreceivingon the channela.
7 indicated graphically by a double circled node.
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any action transition (synchronizing or not)mustinvolve the particular component (the
component is so–to–speak committed to continue). In the state((A1, B1), x = 0, y =
0, n = 5) B1 is committed; thus without any delay the next transition must involve
the B–component. Hence the two first transitions of B are guaranteed to be performed
atomically. Besides ensuring atomicity, the notion ofc mmittednodes also helps in sig-
nificantly reducing the space–consumption during verification. Channels can in addition
be defined asurgent: when two components can synchronize on an urgent channel no
further delay is allowed before communication takes place.
In this section and indeed in the modeling of the audio/video protocol presented in
the following sections, the values of all clocks are assumed to increase with identical
speed (perfect clocks). However, UPPAAL also supports analysis of timed automata with
varying and drifting time–speed of clocks. This feature was crucial in the modeling and
analysis of the Philips Audio–Control protocol [5] using UPPAAL.
UPPAAL is able to check for reachability properties, in particular whether a certain
combination of control-nodes and constraints on clock and data variables is reachable
from an initial configuration. The properties that can be analyzed are of two forms:
“A[]p ” and “E<>p”, where p is a formula over clock variables, data variables, and
control-node positions. Intuitively for “A[]p ” to be satisfied, all reachable states must
satisfyp. Dually, for “E<>p” to be satisfied, some reachable state must satisfyp.
4 Timed Transitions and Interrupts
In this section, we shall introduce techniques for dealing with a couple of concepts that
appear in the protocol, and which are not supported directly by the UPPAAL notation.
These concepts are on the one handtime slicingin combination withtime consuming
transitions, and on the other hand prioritizedinterrupts. We refer to time slicing as the
activity of delegating and scheduling execution rights to processes that all run on the
same single processor. Transitions normally don’t take time in UPPAAL, but this occurs
in the protocol. Interrupts is a well known concept.
First, we give a small example illustrating what we need. Then we suggest the tech-
niques that we shall apply in the modeling of the protocol.
4.1 The Problem
Assume a system with two processes A and B running on a single processor. Assume
further, that these processes can be interrupted by an interrupt handler. The situation is
illustrated in Figure 5, which isnot expressed in the UPPAAL language, but rather in
some informal extension of the language.
Each edge modifies a variable (A modifiesx andy , B modifiesv andw, and the
interrupt handler modifiesi andj ). These assignments only serve to identify the edges
and have no real importance for the example. Each edge is furthermore labeled with a
time slot within parenthesis (2, 5, 7-12 ), indicating the amount of time units the edge
takes. The slot7-12 means anywhere between7 and12 time units.
Suppose the interrupt handler does not interrupt. Then the semantics should be the
following: A and B execute in an interleaved manner modeling the time slicing of the



















InterruptI t trrI t trrI t trr
Fig. 5. What we want to express
time is spent in intermediate nodes (except waiting for the other process to execute). At
the end, as soon as both A and B are in the nodec , at least19 (2 + 5 + 5 + 7) and at
most24 (2 + 5 + 5 + 12) time units will have passed.
An interrupt can occur at any moment and executes “to the end” when occurring.
That is, it goes from nodea to c without neither A norB being allowed to execute in the
meantime. If we assume that the interrupt handler can also interrupt, then it will change
the above numbers to26 (19 + 2 + 5) and31 (24 + 2 + 5).
Or goal is now to formulate this in the UPPAAL language. Consider an approach where
nodes are annotated with time constraints on local clocks, expressing the time consumed
by thepreviousedge. This solution does not work since the two automata may consume
time “together”, and does not reflect the desired behavior, since they are supposed to
run on a single processor. Let us first model time consuming transitions, ignoring the
interrupts for a moment.
4.2 Modeling Timed Transitions
In a single processor setting it is natural to hand over time control to a single “operating








(k <= 12)(   )(   )(   )
w5
(k <= 5)(   )(   )(   )
w2
(k <= 2)(   )(   )(   )
c:back:c ac:c ac:c ac
go
(k <= 0)(   )(   )(   )
Timeri ri ri r
Fig. 6. The Timer
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It has a start node, namedgo , in which time is constrained to not progress at all. This
means that in order for time to progress, one of the edgest2? , t5? or t7 12? must
be taken. These edges then lead to nodes where time can progress the corresponding
number of time units, where after control returns immediately (back is a committed
node just used to collect the edges) to thego node.
Now let us turn to the processes A and B, which are shown in Figure 7. These
now communicate with the Timer, asking for time slots. Every time unitT that in the
informal model, Figure 5, was in brackets(T) is now expressed astT! . When for
example A takes the edge from nodea to nodeb, the Timer goes into the nodew2, and
stays there for2 time units while A stays in nodeb. Hence, the time consumed by an
edge is really consumed in the node it leads to. We have, however, guaranteed that B
for example, cannot go to the nodeb and consume time “in parallel” since that would
















Fig. 7. A and B communicating with the Timer
When A reaches the nodec , it has not yet consumed7 time units (2+5), it has only
consumed2. The5 will be consumed while in nodec . In order to reach a state where
we for sure know that all the time has been consumed, we add an extrad node, which
is reached by communicatingfinish! to the Timer. This forces the Timer to “finish”
the last time consumption. Now we can express and verify the following true property,
wheregc is a global clock variable that is never reset:
A[] (A.d and B.d) imply ((19 <= gc) and (gc <= 24))
That is, if both A and B reach noded, then they will do so within19−24 time units. Note
that due to the design of the Timer, time cannot progress further when that happens (the
Timer will be in thego node where time cannot progress). Of course one can design a
Timer that allows time to progress freely when asked to, and that is in fact what happens
in the protocol. Basically one introduces an idle node in the Timer, that can be entered
upon request, and where time can progress without constraints.
It is possible to model such single processor time scheduling in model checkers
lacking real-time features, such as for example SPIN [15]. However, when trying to
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formulate and verify properties where time ticks are summed up, such explicit modeling
easily leads to state space explosion.
4.3 Modeling Interrupts
Now we incorporate the interrupt handler. The basic idea is to give a priority to each
process, and then maintain a variable, which at any moment contains the priority cur-
rently active. Processes with a priority lower than the current cannot execute. When an
interrupt occurs, the current priority is set to a value higher than those of the processes
interrupted.
Processes A and B can for example have priority0 while the interrupt handler gets
priority 1. When the interrupt occurs, the current priority is then set to1, preventing
priority 0 processes from running. We introduce the variablecur for this purpose, see































InterruptI t trrI t trrI t trr
Fig. 8. Dealing with interrupts
Note how the variablecur occurs in guards of A and B, and how it is assigned to
by the interrupt handler. In this model, we can verify the following property to be true:
A[] (A.d and B.d and Interrupt.d) imply
(26 <= gc and gc <= 31)
5 Formalization in UPPAAL
In this section, we shall formalize the system in UPPAAL. We start with an overview
of the components and their interaction via channels and shared variables. Then we
describe the IOP in detail.
5.1 Component Overview
The system consists of 7 automata, as illustrated in Figure 9. The Timer controls the
time slicing between the components using the technique described in section 4.2. In
addition, there is an environment which generates interrupts corresponding to data ar-





































The components communicate via channel synchronization and via shared vari-
ables. The figure illustrates the channel connections by fully drawn arcs, each going
from one component (the one that does a send “! ”) to another (the one that does a re-
ceive “?”). Also, all shared variables are plotted into the figure, in italics, with dotted
lines indicating their role as message carriers, from the process that typically writes
to the variable to the process that typically reads the variable. This notation is infor-
mal, but it should give an overview of the shared variables and the role they play in
communication. Channels and variables are described below.
5.2 The Channels
The AP signals the IOP to go down by issuing anap down! (which the IOP then con-
sumes by performing a dualp down?). The channelsap down ack and
ap down nack correspond to the IOP’s response to such anap down signal from
the AP. They represent the acknowledgment (ack) respectively the negative acknowl-
edgment (nack) that the closing down has succeeded respectively not succeeded. The
ap active channel is used by the IOP to request the AP to become active.
The channelsreset , wait , wait int , i reset , i wait are all used to op-
erate the timer. Basically, ther set and i reset channels are used to activate the
timer, to start delivering time slots, while thewait , wait int andi wait channels
are used to dis-activate the timer, to stop delivering time slots. Different channels for re-
setting (reset andi reset ) respectively waiting (wait , wait int andi wait )
are needed due to different interpretations of these commands in different contexts.
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Whenever activated, the timer then delivers time slots to the IOP, the LSL (Low Speed
Link) driver, and the interrupt handlers when these issue signals on thet i channels.
5.3 The Shared Variables
The interrupt generator generates interrupts corresponding to data arriving on the links.
Such an interrupt is generated by setting the variablegenerated lsl interrupt
to 1 (true). The LSL interrupt handler then reacts on this by interrupting the IOP
or the driver, whichever is running. A result of such an interrupt is that the variable
lsl interrupt is set to1. The IOP reads the value of this variable, and hence is
triggered to deal with new data if it equals1. In order for the interrupt generator to gen-
erate interrupts at all, the variableenabled lsl interrupt must be1. Concerning
the AP, there is agenerated ap interrupt and anap interrupt , but there is
noenabled ap interrupt . The AP itself plays the role as AP interrupt generator,
and hence sets thegenerated ap interrupt to 1, while the AP interrupt handler
reacts to this by setting theap interrupt to 1. The variablesome interrupt is
1 whenever eitherap interrupt or lsl interrupt is 1.
The variablecur is used to secure that an interrupt handler gets higher priority than
the process it interrupts. Note that in this sense, the IOP and the driver have the lowest
priority (0), while the LSL interrupt handler has one higher (1), and the AP interrupt
handler has the highest (2). Hence, whenever the value ofcur is 0, the IOP and the LSL
driver are allowed to execute. When the LSL interrupt handler starts executing, it sets
the value to1, whereby the IOP and driver are no longer allowed to execute. The AP
interrupt handler can further interrupt all the previous processes, assigning2 to cur ,
whereby all other processes with lower priority are denied to execute.
We said that the AP interrupt handler can interrupt the LSL interrupt handler. This
is a truth with modifications. In fact, it is not allowed to interrupt during the initializa-
tion phase of the LSL interrupt handler. This is modeled by introducing a semaphore
lsl interrupt ex . It is used to exclude the AP interrupt handler from interrupting
the LSL interrupt handler during the latter’s first activities.
The IOP sends messages to the LSL driver by assigning values to the variable
lsl commandwith the following meanings:1 = Initialize the driver, 2 = Close down
the driver, and3 = Activate the driver. After initialization of the driver, the IOP can
read the results of the driver’s activity (whether it is still running and whether there
are data or not) in the variableslsl running andlsl data . Since the model is a
reduction from a bigger model also involving the AP driver, we had early in the design
a need for maintaining a variablesome running , being true if eitherap running
or lsl running was true, and likewise we needed a variablesome data , being
true if eitherlsl data or other similar variables were true. These two variables have
survived after we have reduced the model.
The three variablesw stand by , sleeping andsleep op are central to the
closing down procedure, and the interaction between the IOP and the interrupt han-
dlers. Figure 10 illustrates the relevant pieces of code in the IOP (when approaching
stand by mode), respectively the Interrupt handlers. To start with the IOP, the variable
sleep op is a kind of“emergency break”which can be “pulled” by the interrupt han-
dler. The IOP assignstrue to this variable, and it has to betrue before going to sleep.
13
The interrupt handler can change the value ofsleepop “in last micro second”. Next,
the IOP assignstrue to the variablesw stand by when approaching thestand by
node. Hence this variable istrue in a certain critical time zone just before closing
down8. When the IOP finally goes down (enters thestand by mode), the variable
sleeping becomestrue.
The value ofsw stand by is used by the interrupt handlers when activated to
see whether the IOP is in its critical closing down zone. If so, they assign the value
false to the variablesleep op , and this will then prevent the IOP from going to
sleep. The interrupt handlers also “wake up” (sleeping := 0 ) the IOP in case it is
sleeping (sleeping == 1 ). Thesleeping variable is used by the interrupt handler
to direct the amount of time used to restart the IOP. Ifsleeping == 1 it takes 900
micro seconds, otherwise it is instantaneous. We shall see the IOP algorithm formulated
in UPPAAL below.
IOP: Interrupt Handler:
sleep_op := 1; If sleeping == 1 Then
sw_stand_by := 1; ‘‘spend 900 ms’’
If sleep_op == 1 Then sleeping := 0
sleeping := 1; End;
‘‘stand by’’ If sw_stand_by == 1 Then
End; sleep_op := 0;
‘‘after interrupt’’: sw_stand_by := 0
sw_stand_by := 0 End;
‘‘go up’’
Fig. 10.The variablessw stand by , sleeping andsleep op
5.4 The IOP
The IOP, Figure 11, is obtained by refining (in an informal sense) the abstract model
presented in Figure 3. The model is refined usingstate refinementas well asaction
refinement. By state refinement we mean that certain states (the ovals) are expanded out
to sub–transition systems with new states connected with new (labeled) arcs. We have
enclosed these new sub–systems in boxes on Figure 11 such that they can be easier
related to Figure 3. Note, however, that this is not formal UPPAAL notation. By action
refinement we mean that also arcs are expanded out to such sub–transition systems.
Concerning state refinement, we have expanded each“check driver” state into a couple
of states:driver call – representing the point where a driver has been called – and
driver return – representing the point where the driver returns. The state“ch ck
interrupts” has been expanded out to a small transition system consisting of the four
states:insert noop , set stand by , check interrupts andcheck noop .
The IOP starts being active, in the nodeactive . In this node it does not need time
slots, hence the timer is supposed to be inactive. Note that although the IOP is in the
nodeactive , and hence intuitively is active, from a technical point of view, we don’t
see it as requiring time slots, since it does not take any transitions.
8 In the C-implementation, the variablesw stand by is a register informing the processor
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Now it can receive anap down signal from the AP, ordering it to close down. It
then proceeds (up, left – referring to the approximate position on the figure) by reset-
ting the timer –reset! , indicating that now it wants processor time slots necessary
to close down. It then initializes the variableslsl running (to 1) and lsl data
(to 0) preparing the activation of the LSL driver, initially assuming that there are no
data. Note the “priority 0” guard –cur == 0 – and the time slot demand –t6! –
requiring6 micro seconds to initialize these variables. The time constant, and all other
time constants in the model, have been estimated by the protocol developers at B&O.
When the driver later returns, it will have set the variablels running to 0, and now
the IOP can check the value oflsl data . The driver is, however, first activated with
the assignment of2 (close down) to the variablesl commandin the edge leading to
the nodedriver call1 .
In this node the IOP waits for the driver to finish its job. If at that point, in node
driver return1 , lsl data equals1 there is data, and the IOP must activate the
driver – lsl commandis assigned the value3 – and it must respond to the AP with a
negative acknowledgment –ap down nack! . If on the other handlsl data equals
0, then there are no data on the link, and the IOP can proceed successfully to close
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down, next checking whether there are any interrupts. First, however, it acknowledges
via anap down ack! signal to the AP, and then goes to the nodeinsert noop
(up, right) to check interrupts. A possible trace from here leads to the nodestand by ,
where the IOP is sleeping, and can only be wakened by an interrupt. The waiting for
an interrupt is done by issuing await int! signal to the timer just before entering
thestand by node. When an interrupt occurs thereafter, the timer will ensure that the
IOP is re-activated immediately.
If on the other hand, before reaching thestand by node, an interrupt has already
occurred, then the IOP will avoid going into that node and instead go directly to the
wake up node. Hence, in this node we assume that an interrupt has occurred, and now
the LSL driver has to be re-started, since apparently there must be data. This means re-
initializing the variableslsl running andlsl data , and then assigning the value
1 (initialize) to lsl command. In the nodedriver call2 , the IOP then waits for
the LSL driver to return. If there is data –lsl data equals1 – the AP is asked to
become active –ap active! – and the IOP goes into the nodeactive . Note that
when entering this node, await! signal is issued to the timer to dis-activate it. If on the
other hand there are no data –lsl data equals0 – then what has been encountered
is noise, and the nodenoise is entered. In this node the IOP wants to close down, but
before doing this, the driver is asked to close down –lsl command is assigned the
value2. The IOP then waits in the nodedriver return3 for the drivers response.
Now, if there is data –lsl data equals1 the AP is activated –ap active! –
and the nodeactive is entered. If on the other hand there are no data –lsl data
equals0 – then the IOP returns to the nodeinsert noop (up, right), ready to check
the interrupts again, and close down (if an interrupt does not occur, etc.).
Note that some transitions labeled with channel communications are not labeled
with the priority guardcur == 0 . These channels are elsewhere defined as urgent,
meaning that communication must take place immediately whenever enabled.
6 Verification of Selected Properties
In this section a collection of properties will be formulated and verified using the UP-
PAAL logic and verification tool. In order to verify these properties, a set of techniques
for annotating the model and for defining observer automata have been applied. These
techniques are presented first. Then follows the formulation and verification of the in-
dividual properties of which there are 15.
6.1 Model Annotation and Test Automata
Amongst the properties formulated by B&O, in particular three kinds were typical and
needed special techniques. The general principle behind the three techniques, to be de-
scribed below, is toannotatethe model by adding new variables or communication
actions, and then observe these, either by mentioning the variables in the formulae to be
verified (the first two techniques) or by letting the new communication actions synchro-
nize with a furthermore added observer automaton (the third technique). The need for
these techniques is caused by the existing logic in which it only is possible to state prop-
erties like: “A[]p ” and “E<>p”, wherep is an atomic predicate over program variables
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and nodes (hence no nesting of modal operators). Theoretical as well as practical work
is currently undertaken to extend the UPPAAL logic, defining translations into model
annotations and observers as outlined below.
The FLAG Technique The first technique, called the FLAG technique for later refer-
ence, is illustrated in Figure 12. Suppose we have an automaton A containing two states








There must be a path from a to b t   t  f   t  r r t   t  f   t  r r t   t  f   t  r r
Annotated_At tt tt t
E<> b and a_reached == 1     r     r     r
Fig. 12.Automaton A and its annotation
Note, that the current logic does not allow nested modal operators, hence it is for
example not possible to state this as: “E<> (a and E<>b) ” saying that there exists
a path such that eventually nodea is reached and from there nodeb can be reached. The
technique consists of annotating automaton A, obtaining automaton AnnotatedA, by
adding a booleanflagvariablea reached , which initially has the value0, and which
is assigned the value1 when passing througha. The property can now be formally
stated as follows: “E<>(b and a reached == 1) ”. That is, eventually nodeb is
reached, after having passed through nodea.
The DEBT technique The second technique, called the DEBT technique, is illustrated
in Figure 13. Suppose we have an automaton B containing three states (amongst others):
a, b andx , and suppose we want to verify, that“every path froma to b must pass
throughx ” .
In an imagined extended logic this could be formulated as follows:
“A[] (a imply ((not b) Until x)) ” saying that if at any timea is reached,
then “not b ” will hold until x has been reached9. The technique consists of annotating
automaton B, obtaining automaton AnnotatedB, by adding a boolean variabledebt ,
which initially has the value0, and which is assigned the value1 when passing through
a. Furthermore, when passing throughx it is reset to0 – the debt has been “cashed”.
The property can now be formally stated as follows: “A[] b imply debt == 0 ”.
That is, if at any point nodeb is reached, thendebt must not be1, since that would
indicate that nodea had been reached before, but notx in between.9 Note that theUntil operator here must beweakin the sense that nodex need not be reached
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Every path from a to b must pass x t  f   t   t  r r t  f   t   t  r r t  f   t   t  r r
Fig. 13.Automaton B and its annotation
The OBSERVERTechnique The last technique, called the OBSERVERtechnique, is il-
lustrated in Figure 14. Suppose we have an automaton C containing two nodes (amongst
others):a andb, and suppose we want to verify, that“from node a, nodeb must be
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A[] not bad[] t [] t [] t 
Fig. 14.Automaton C, its annotation and observer
In an extended logic this could be formulated as follows: “A[] (a imply A<T>
b) ” saying that if at any timea is reached, then eventually – withinT time units – node
b will be reached. The technique consists of annotating automaton C, obtaining au-
tomaton AnnotatedC, by adding two kinds of communication actions, each of which
communicates with an added observer that measures time. Let’s first look at Anno-
tatedC. When in nodea, a begin! signal can be issued, telling the observer to start
measure time. When reaching nodeb, no matter along which path, ane d! signal is is-
sued, telling the observer to stop measure time. The channele d is declared asurgent,
hence it will be taken as soon as nodeb is reached.
The Observer automaton rests in thestart node until it receives abegin? signal
(nodea reached), where after it initializes its local clockand enters the nodewait
where time can progress. Time can, however, only progressT time units due to the
node invariant, where after the nodebad is entered. If on the other hand ane d?
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signal is received before that, then the nodegood is entered. The property can now be
formally stated as a property of the observer: “A[] not bad ”. That is, the Observer
will never reach nodebad : anend? signal will always be received (b reached) before
T time units.
6.2 Property Verification
In this section we shall present the results of analyzing in UPPAAL various desired prop-
erties. The properties as directly formulated by B&O are listed below, with explanatory
comments in brackets. The listing is just supposed to give the reader a general feeling
of the kinds of properties formulated.
1. sleeping must not change from 0 to 1 whilesleep op has the value 0.(The IOP must
not go to sleep if there has been an interrupt – see Figure 10 for an explanation of these
variables.)
2. There must be a path fromactive to stand by and vice versa.(It must be possible for
the IOP to switch between its two final states.)
3. Every path fromactive to noise must pass throughstand by (The IOP must have
been asleep before reaching thenoise state where it on its way up due to an interrupt
discovers that the interrupt is “false”, and hence caused by noise only.)
4. The variablesleeping must not change from 0 to 1 whilelsl interrupt is 1 or
ap interrupt is 1 (The IOP must not go to sleep as long as there is an untreated inter-
rupt.)
5. The shortest way fromdriver return1 to driver call2 does not take more than
1500µs (If the IOP on its way down verifies that the link is empty by calling the driver, and
then immediately thereafter data arrive (an interrupt occurs) no more than1500 µs must
pass before the driver is called again.)
6. The shortest way fromdriver return1 to active does not take more than 1500µs (If
the IOP on its way down discovers data on the link by calling the driver, then no more than
1500 µs must pass before the IOP is active again.)
7. The shortest way fromdriver return3 to driver call2 does not take more than
1500µs (Like 5, but in a different place in the protocol’s execution.)
8. The shortest way fromdriver return3 to active does not take more than 1500µs
(Like 6, but in a different place in the protocol’s execution.)
9. If the last value of the variablelsl commandhas been 1 or 3 (driver starting commands),
then the value ofsleeping must not change from 0 to 1(If the last command issued to the
driver was a “start command”, then the IOP must not go to sleep.)
10. If the last value oflsl commandhas been 3 (activate driver), then the next value must not
be 1 (initialize driver), and vice versa(In between two driver starting commands must come
a driver closing command.)
11. No more than 1500µs must pass from an interrupt occurs until all drivers are active
12. It must be possible for both interrupt handlers to want to assign0 to sleep op at the same
time, while in addition this variable’s value is already0 (Intuition missing – “technical”
property.)
13. If both interrupt handlers want to assign0 to sleep op at the same time, then the IOP will
be in one of the nodes:et stand by , check interrupts , check noop ,
w stand by , stand by , orwake up (If both an LSL and an AP interrupt occur, and both
interrupt handlers believe that the IOP is approaching stand by mode, then this is the case.)
14. It must be possible to come from the nodenoise to the nodestand by (In case IOP has
discovered noise on the link, it will reach stand by mode and go to sleep, unless data arrive.)
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15. I should not be possible to come from the nodestand by to the nodeactive without
synchronizing on the channelap active (The IOP cannot get from stand by mode to
active mode without activating the AP.)
Figure 15 shows the verification results, indicating the outcome (satisfied or not)
and the verification technique used. Those properties not verified using any of the three
techniques outlined in section 6.1 have been verified using other and simpler techniques:
“ trivial ” means the property was seen correct without verification. “formula” means that
the property could be directly stated in the UPPAAL temporal logic. Finally, “formula
+ aux. variable” means that by adding an additional variable being updated in appro-
priate places, the property could be directly stated in the UPPAAL temporal logic. The
properties were verified using UPPAAL version2.17 from March 1998, on a Sun Ultra
Sparc 60 with512 MB main memory.
No. Satisfied?Technique Comment Memory Time
(MB) (min:sec)
1 YES trivial
2 YES FLAG 5.3 0:5
3 NO DEBT should not be satisfied 4.1 0:2
4 YES formula 8.2 0:9
5 NO OBSERVER 18 AP interrupts causes error36.0 1:42
6 NO OBSERVER 24 AP interrupts causes error22.0 0:56
7 ? OBSERVER state explosion
8 NO OBSERVER 79 AP interrupts causes error157.0 33:39
9 YES formula + aux. variable 8.3 0:9
10 YES formula + aux. variable 8.7 0:25
11 YES OBSERVER 16.0 0:41
12 NO formula should not be satisfied 7.9 0:8
13 YES formula 8.2 0:9
14 YES FLAG 8.0 0:8
15 YES trivial
Fig. 15.Verification results
Properties3 and12 turned out not to be satisfied, and after having examined the
error traces B&O recognized that these properties were wrongly formulated and hence
the “error” traces showed valid behaviors.
Properties5–8, on the other hand, are interesting in the sense that their verifications
failed and caused B&O to reconsider their design. In particular property5 gave an
error trace, where a single LSL interrupt and 18 AP interrupts, all consuming time, are
generated before the next driver call. As a result, B&O decided to only allow one AP
interrupt to occur in their implementation.
7 Conclusion
During a period of 3 weeks, a model of B&O’s Power Down protocol was developed
and verified using the UPPAAL language and model checker. The first week consisted
of an intense collaboration between AAU and B&O, where the B&O representative vis-
ited AAU. During this week, a first sketch of the model was written down in UPPAAL’s
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language. The model was based on an initial design sketch made by the company rep-
resentative. The work carried out during the following two weeks was mainly carried
out by AAU. Hence, during the second week, a technique was introduced for dealing
with timed transitions and interrupts. During this same week, the model was reduced by
omitting certain components in order to obtain a model being verifiable within reason-
able time and memory space. In other words, at the end of the second week, a model
was produced that was ready for verification. At the beginning of the third (and last)
week, various properties to be verified were formulated by B&O in natural language.
These were then translated into the UPPAAL temporal logic, together with various mod-
ifications to the model, and all verifications were then carried out.
After the collaboration, the company made a C-code implementation, and after a
testing phase (which did not reveal any design errors), the implementation is by now
ready to be put into operation in the new company product.
During the development of models, we found that the notion of timed automata
and their graphical representation served extremely well as a communication medium
between the industrial protocol designer and the tool expert doing the simulation and
verification. In addition, the graphical simulation features of UPPAAL lead to fast de-
tection of (obvious) errors in the early models.
The protocol was verified correct wrt. the 15 properties formulated by B&O, and
although no bugs were identified, various critical time constants were identified, which
should be obeyed in order to keep the protocol correct. Various unexpected, but correct,
behaviors were furthermore demonstrated, challenging the understanding of the pro-
tocol. Overall, the experience appeared to increase B&O’s confidence in their design.
The fact that 3 errors were caught during the modeling phase suggests that just spec-
ifying a system can be very informative. In fact, B&O claimed they had got a better
understanding of their system this way.
The collaboration has been beneficial for both partners: B&O now considers tools
like UPPAAL as viable means to improve the design process for time-critical software.
Also, in order to model the system, we have developed techniques for modeling timed
transitions and prioritized interrupts. A timed transition is a transition which consumes
time, like code in a program which takes time to execute. It is a special circumstance,
that several processes run on a single processor. To the best of our knowledge, such
techniques have not been presented elsewhere.
What concerns the UPPAAL tool set, we anticipate investigating techniques for ver-
sion control, (keeping track of several related models), and we consider tool support for
defining abstractions. Both themes appear non-trivial in fact. Concerning the UPPAAL
language, a technical contribution of the work is a way of modeling timed transitions
and interrupts in a setting where several processes share one processor. In the forth-
coming new version of UPPAAL, the introduction ofparameterizedtimed automatons
will support a more structural way to define time consuming transitions than we have
presented in this paper. In [11], the problem of supporting task scheduling is treated. It
is likely that this work will be included in later versions of UPPAAL.
In this work, we have sketched a number of patterns which may be used to define
properties of real-time systems. In [1, 2] the limits of UPPAAL’s model checking lan-
guage are characterized. In future versions of UPPAAL, its timed logic will be modified
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according to these results - thereby supporting the definition of the patterns in a more
direct way.
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